This was inevitable and not entirely novel.
https://x.com/tehlike/status/1432082161125888003 https://x.com/tehlike/status/1467033965215109122
The whole concept of Google Tag Manager was that you could give marketing departments the ability to add "tags" to the website without having to involve engineering. That's how we got 10MB of javascript with every news article.
I hope folks are re-evaluating that now.
> On iPhone/iPad/iPod only: injects boot.js from two .icu hosts and, on iOS ≤ 18.6, a hidden iframe.
Anyone knows what this might be? Can you jailbreak from safari on those versions?
[edit] From the other link, it seems to be Coruna and DarkSword exploits
Every time one of these new attacks drops, you know there's a couple devs at OpenAI that look at each other and go, "This definitely wasn't us, right? ...right?" And how confident are they that out of Outlook, FAA, banks, and now Optimizely skimmer that none of them were either 1) agents up to some fuckery or 2) someone using their system to get up to some fuckery? It can't be 100% confident, right? ...right?
Optimizely Status site: https://status.optimizely.com/
Currently says "Partial Outage Affecting Recommendations Tracking and Reporting"
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Unfortunate with this nonsense slop report for a seemingly significant event like this.
> Your origin can be clean while your visitors are robbed — the compromise sits in the tag layer.
ahhh yes, the famous tag layer
It’s right above the egg layer.
Let’s say I use Optimizely (I don’t), is there a good best practice to say?:
“yeah load this JS m, but it can’t load / random other JS referencing sketchy places”
In theory yes, in practice no since every SaaS wants to ship 5 times a day and add 15 new dependencies on other SaaS providers each release, and marketing wants to load gobs of 3rd party tracking and analytics code from their favorite SaaS of the day without having to get approval from those pesky security people. Let's not even mention ad networks.
Besides specifying scripts by hashes, you can also whitelist various domains: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP (and https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/...)
Feels nice knowing several years ago I worked on forcing CSP (including removing unsafe-eval) on some customers for a site builder product, as they have to manually whitelist domains which limits the impact of these sorts of attacks...
This writeup https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w... has a section on how CSP helped (or didn't) in this attack.
Very cool thank you.
SRI helps you make sure the script you're loading is what you initially thought, but doesn't ensure that script doesn't load other scripts, no? You need CSP for that.
Specifying scripts by hashes is always a solid defense that platforms like this don't change their script after compromise - but in practice the whole point of optimizely and similar tools it that it's expected the script will change.
Common examples like analytics tools happily change their script bundles whenever they feel like it without just tagging a new version and letting you upgrade.
I wish SRI could be used more,